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Abstract 
Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SADs; n = 41) and healthy controls (HCs; n = 40) were 
administered the Waterloo Images and Memories Interview, in which they described mental 
images that they tend to experience in both anxiety-provoking and non-anxiety-provoking social 
situations and then recalled, in as much detail as pos ible, specific autobiographical memories of 
salient aversive and non-aversive social experiences that they believed led to the formation of 
these images. Participants’ audio-recorded memory narratives were transcribed and coded based 
on the procedure of the Autobiographical Interview, which provides a precise measure of the 
degree of episodic detail contained within each memory. Participants also rated the subjective 
properties of their recalled memories. Results revealed that participants across the two groups  
retrieved equivalent rates of both aversive and non-aversive social memories. However, SAD 
participants’ memories of aversive events contained significantly more episodic detail than those 
of HCs, suggesting that they may be more highly accessible. Moreover, participants with SAD 
appraised their memories of aversive experiences as more distressing and intrusive than HCs, 
and perceived them as having a significantly greate influence on their self-perception. In 
contrast, no group differences were observed for memories of non-aversive events. Findings 
have the potential to shed new light on autobiographical memory in SAD, with possible 
implications for psychotherapeutic intervention. 
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Highlights 
• Examined aversive/non-aversive memory retrieval in social anxiety disorder (SAD)  
 
• SADs and controls equally accessed aversive and non-aversive memories 
 
• SADs’ aversive memories contained richer episodic detail than those of controls 
 
• SADs appraised aversive memories as more distressing, intrusive, and self-relevant 
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Autobiographical Memory Retrieval and Appraisal in Social Anxiety Disorder  
1. Introduction 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a highly prevalent, disabling, and difficult-to-treat 
problem characterized by anxious preoccupation withthe prospect of social scrutiny and 
evaluation (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Stein & Stein, 2008). At its core, social 
anxiety is fueled by negative self-perception (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Socially anxious individuals perceive themselves as socially incompetent, 
visibly anxious, and/or physically unattractive, and they worry that these unappealing flaws 
might be exposed to critical others within social contexts (Moscovitch, 2009). When self-
evaluative concerns become salient in social and interpersonal situations, people with SAD 
initiate self-concealment behaviours, elude engagement with others, and withdraw from the 
social arena (Moscovitch et al., 2013; Plasencia, Alden, & Taylor, 2011). These avoidance 
strategies, in turn, induce negative evaluation from others, resulting in diminished social support 
and increased functional impairment (Plasencia, Taylor, & Alden, 2016; Rowa et al., 2015).  
In recent years, advancements in social anxiety resea ch have bolstered our understanding 
of the interactive cognitive-behavioural processes underlying the development, persistence, and 
treatment of SAD (e.g., Weeks, 2014). However, many important questions remain unanswered. 
One such set of questions, which the current study aims to address, focuses on the nature of 
autobiographical memory recall in SAD. As reviewed by Morgan (2010), more than two decades 
of research has found little consistent evidence in support of autobiographical memory biases in 
SAD despite their presumed central role in the development and maintenance of social anxiety 
symptoms (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Nevertheless, it may be premature 
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on the current literature has been hindered by inconsistencies in how key memory outcomes have 
been operationalized and measured in previous studies (for a comprehensive review of this 
literature, see Zlomuzica et al., 2014). Here, we aim to apply a fresh lens to this field of study. 
To do so, we draw upon evidence supporting the intimate link between autobiographical 
memories and mental images in SAD, which has helped to spawn methodological advances in 
the conceptualization and measurement of biases in autobiographical memory specificity, recall, 
and appraisal. 
Socially anxious people commonly report the experience of unpleasant negative mental 
images before, during, and after socially threatening events (Chiupka, Moscovitch, & Bielak, 
2012) in which they envision themselves behaving in an anxious and/or socially awkward 
manner (e.g., Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006). These images are exaggerated and distorted, but 
socially anxious individuals perceive them as meaningful and accurate representations of how 
others view them during interpersonal encounters (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004; Hirsch, Clark, 
Mathews, & Williams, 2003).1 Pioneering research by Hackmann and colleagues using semi-
structured interviews demonstrated that people withSAD routinely trace the formation of their 
negative self-images to specific autobiographical memories of past distressing social experiences 
that coincided with the onset or worsening of their symptoms (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 
2000; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998). While considerable experimental and clinical 
research has highlighted the important role of negatively biased mental imagery in the emotional 
disorders in general (e.g., Holmes & Mathews, 2010) and SAD, in particular (e.g., Stopa, 2009), 
                                                        
1 Though low-anxious individuals might also experienc  egative image instruions in anxiety-provoking social 
situations, they tend to cope with such intrusions in a more adaptive manner (for example, by spontaneously 
modifying their negative perceptual features within their imagination), which helps to inhibit negatively biased 
interpretations of their meaning and mitigate anxious distress (Moscovitch, Chiupka, & Gavric, 2013; Moscovitch, 
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our current understanding of the nature and impact of autobiographical memories in SAD 
remains significantly underdeveloped (see Morgan, 2010; Moscovitch, 2016; Zlomuzica et al., 
2014).  
Autobiographical memory is a type of episodic memory that involves explicit 
recollections of personal life events that occurred at a particular time and place; in contrast, 
semantic memory encodes and stores information pertaining to general knowledge about 
ourselves and the world that does not involve re-experiencing past events (Tulving, 1972; 1985; 
1989). For example, “I am socially incompetent” is a emantic memory that relies on one’s 
retrieval of general schema-based self-knowledge. Conversely, “my face turned red when I 
presented in front of the class in sixth grade” is an episodic memory that relies on one’s 
awareness of oneself as a continuous entity across time who experienced that particular episode 
at that particular time (Romano, Ma, Moscovitch, & Moscovitch, in press).  
Recent findings support the notion that participants with high levels of trait social anxiety 
or SAD can readily recall specific anxiety-related autobiographical memories of negative past 
personal events, which they perceive as being self-defining and central to their identity (Krans, 
de Bree, & Bryant, 2014; Krans et al., 2017; Moscovitch et al., 2011; O’Toole, Watson, 
Rosenberg, & Berntsen, 2016; Wenzel & Cochran, 2006). Given that these autobiographical 
memories are likely to contribute to the negative views of self that lie at the heart of the disorder, 
there is good reason to suspect that investigating their nature and impact with improved measures 
might help to elucidate why negative self-appraisals are so pervasive and resistant to change in 
SAD, even in the face of corrective feedback (see Koban et al., 2017). Such research could also 
provide important clues for how psychotherapeutic interventions may be optimized to target 
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 Autobiographical memory biases in the emotional disorders have been most commonly 
studied via the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), a widely 
used memory cuing paradigm, but one that has come und r increasing methodological scrutiny 
and criticism. As reviewed by Griffith and colleagues (2012), various crucial aspects of AMT 
administration have not been properly standardized across studies, including the modality in 
which memory cues have been presented (e.g., in oral, visual, or written forms); the cue word 
lists and their characteristics; the application of response time limits; and the scoring procedures 
and criteria – all factors which may affect the way memories are retrieved and findings are 
interpreted.  
Seeking an alternative to the AMT, we developed the Waterloo Images and Memories 
Interview (WIMI; Moscovitch et al., 2011), a structured assessment in which trained interviewers 
elicit narrative descriptions of participants’ mental images and associated autobiographical 
memories. Narratives are audio-recorded and transcribed, then coded by trained research 
assistants blind to the group status of participants based on the meticulous procedure of the 
Autobiographical Interview (AI; Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002). The AI 
coding enables fine-grained distinctions between episodic and semantic memory details for each 
grammatical clause within the narrative. Following AI protocol, details are coded segment-by-
segment as being internal when they describe any episodic aspect of a specific vent occurring at 
a particular time and place. Conversely, xternal details consist of general facts and semantic 
knowledge that do not require recollection of a specific event occurring at a particular time and 
place. Since external details do not carry any essential information about the recollected episode 
itself, it is the amount of internal detail per se that determines how rich the episodic memory 
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in a global and dichotomized fashion as being either ov rgeneral or specific (e.g., to determine 
whether or not participants are capable of retrieving specific autobiographical memories that 
occurred at specific times and places), the AI coding system enables researchers to delve deeper 
into the narrative structure and characteristics of endorsed memories in order to determine 
whether they may be enhanced or degraded in particul r types of detail (e.g., to determine how 
much episodic detail participants retrieve in their specific autobiographical memories).  
The AI has recently been applied to investigate the memory characteristics of individuals 
with clinical diagnoses of Major Depressive Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder . Studies 
of depression that have relied on the AMT have classic lly shown that when cued with emotional 
words, depressed individuals preferentially retrieve o erly general or repeated memories rather 
than specific memories of events that occurred at a particular time and place (see Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2001; Williams et al., 2007). This pattern of findings has since been extended through 
the application of the AI coding scheme to memory narratives of depressed vs. non-depressed 
individuals by showing that depressed participants, relative to non-depressed controls, possessed 
unique deficits in recalling internal episodic memory details, and that these impairments did not 
extend to external details (Söderlund et al., 2014). A subsequent study using the AI to examine 
traumatic and non-traumatic memories in individuals with and without PTSD enhanced our 
understanding of memory in PTSD by demonstrating that autobiographical memories of 
traumatic events were characterized by significant enhancements in the recall of internal episodic 
detail but that such enhancements occurred for traumatic memories irrespective of participants’ 
PTSD status. Additionally, participants with and without PTSD were distinguishable only by the 
amount of external details contained within their memory narratives, with external detail 
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studies that have relied on the AI to study autobiographical memory biases in the emotional 
disorders have begun to yield intriguing outcomes that shed new light on previously 
uninvestigated aspects of episodic memories in depression and PTSD that cannot be detected by 
the AMT. 
There are several possible outcomes of interest. It i  possible that, like traumatic 
memories in people with and without PTSD (McKinnon et al., 2015), negative autobiographical 
memories in SAD may also be characterized by enriched episodic detail; indeed, previous 
research has suggested that PTSD-relevant traumatic emories and SAD-relevant socially 
traumatic memories share similar characteristics (Carleton, Peluso, Collimore, & Asmundson, 
2011; Erwin, Heimberg, Marx, & Franklin, 2006). If we indeed find that memories of aversive 
past experiences in SAD are retrieved in more episodic detail, such memories would be expected 
to be highly accessible and exert a strong impact on socially anxious individuals’ emotions and 
self-attitudes than less detailed memories. Moreover, in light of the well-documented overlap in 
the cognitive and affective substrates of SAD and depression (e.g., Moscovitch, Hofmann, 
Suvak, & In-Albon, 2005), it is also plausible that autobiographical memories retrieved by 
people with SAD would be degraded in episodic detail, p rticularly for memories of past positive 
social experiences, thus dampening the accessibility and potential salutary impact of such 
memories and providing further evidence in support of the “positivity deficits” hypothesis in 
social anxiety (Kashdan, Weeks, & Savostyanova, 2011). Finally, it is possible that the 
autobiographical memories of those with SAD might also consist of more negatively-valenced 
external details, perhaps demonstrating that memory c ntent in SAD is heavily imbued with non-
specific self-knowledge derived primarily from negative self-schemas, like for those with PTSD 
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specific autobiographical memories in SAD requires researchers to assess and operationalize 
memory details in a deeper and more nuanced manner than the globally dichotomized outcomes 
produced by the coding procedures of the AMT.2 
Using the WIMI coupled with the coding scheme of the AI, we have begun to investigate 
the nature of episodic memory retrieval in social anxiety. In an initial study (Moscovitch et al., 
2011), we administered the WIMI to investigate images and memories experienced in both 
aversive and non-aversive social contexts (i.e., those in which participants reported feeling 
anxious and distressed, and those in which participants reported feeling comfortable and 
content). We found that negative images and memories were commonly endorsed by individuals 
across the full spectrum of trait social anxiety. However, negative images were more emotionally 
impactful and appraised more negatively when retrieved by high socially anxious individuals. 
When we blind-coded the image and memory narratives using the AI coding scheme, we 
discovered that non-negative images were significantly impoverished in episodic detail for high 
socially anxious participants only. Moreover, participants with higher levels of social anxiety 
differed significantly from their low anxiety counterparts in their subjective appraisals of 
negative images. Unexpectedly, these group differences in episodic detail and subjective 
appraisals of negative images did not extend to assciated negative memories. It is possible that 
the absence of group differences in the appraisal and retrieval of negative memories in our 
original study was due to our use of a younger, undergraduate nonclinical sample, and that 
stronger group differences would emerge if the WIMI were to be administered to an older, 
community sample of participants with a clinical diagnosis of SAD. Alternatively, it is also 
                                                        
2 Of note, the AI coding framework examines the detail dness of memories rather than their specificity per se. For 
example, a specific memory could be coded on the AI as having low internal detail and a non-specific memory as 
having high internal detail. The present study was de igned to assess the retrieval and detailedness of specific 
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possible that unique patterns of negative memory appraisal and retrieval are not as important in 
the phenomenology of SAD as we might have believed, no matter which memory measures and 
procedures are used. 
In the present study, we trained independent interviewers to administer the WIMI 
individually to participants with SAD and healthy controls (HCs). Aversive and non-aversive 
memories were retrieved and subjectively appraised by participants and memory narratives were 
later blind-coded and scored by research assistants b sed on the AI procedures. We advanced 
three hypotheses. First, based on our previous findings that, irrespective of their social anxiety 
levels, the vast majority of WIMI participants can retrieve specific autobiographical memories of 
aversive past social experiences when cued by negativ  imagery (e.g., Moscovitch et al., 2011), 
we predicted that participants with SAD and HCs would retrieve an equivalent number of mental 
images and associated specific autobiographical memori s across both aversive and non-aversive 
events. Second, we expected to observe a double dissociation across groups in the types of 
details participants would retrieve in their aversive vs. non-aversive specific memories, and in 
the way aversive vs. non-aversive specific memories would be appraised. Specifically, we 
hypothesized that aversive memories would be recollted in greater internal episodic detail and 
would impact those with SAD more negatively than HCs, and that non-aversive memories would 
be retrieved in impoverished internal episodic detail and impact participants with SAD less 
positively than HCs. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that aversive memories retrieved by SAD 
participants would contain more negative external details reflecting the input of non-specific 
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The study sample consisted of 81 participants, 41 of wh m met DSM-5 (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013) criteria for a current principal diagnosis of SAD, and 40 of whom 
were HCs without a history of significant mental health concerns. Participants, including HCs, 
were recruited from the community via online and paper advertisements. The SAD group was, 
on average, 30.97 years old (SD = 12.6) and was comprised of 65.9% females, with 48.1% 
identifying as White/European, 18.5% as Asian, 7.4% as South Asian, 7.4% as Latin American, 
3.7% as Black, and 11.1% as Other. The HC group was, on average, 30.2 years old (SD = 15.1) 
and consisted of 65.0% females, with 65.7% identifyi g as White/European, 17.1% as Asian, 
8.6% as South Asian, none as Latin American or Black, nd 5.7% as Other.  
2.2. Diagnostic assessment 
All potentially eligible participants in both groups were screened for symptoms of social 
anxiety and exclusion criteria using an online questionnaire and subsequent phone screen 
adapted from the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan, 2014), a well-
validated semi-structured diagnostic interview (Pinninti, Madison, Musser, & Rissmiller, 2003; 
Sheehan et al., 1998). In order to establish diagnoses, participants who endorsed symptoms on 
the phone screen consistent with a diagnosis of SADwere invited to the lab, where the MINI was 
administered by trained interviewers. Individuals who denied symptoms during screening were 
enrolled in the study as HCs. To augment our diagnostic assessment, we appended the MINI 
with symptom checklists adapted from the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule (ADIS; Brown 
& Barlow, 2014). Exclusion criteria for the clinical group included endorsement of active and 
clinically significant suicidality, mania, psychosis, or substance abuse or dependence. Exclusion 
criteria for the HC group included endorsement of any symptoms that could reasonably have met 
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Interviewers were clinical psychology graduate students trained extensively in 
psychological assessment, with all cases reviewed by two licensed clinical psychologists. The 
principal diagnosis was the one deemed most clinicaly interfering and/or distressing. Interrater 
agreement on the principal diagnosis was 100% for asubset of interviewers who met 
independently on two separate occasions with a subsample of 10 clinical participants. Within the 
clinical sample, 27 participants (65.9%) received an additional diagnosis secondary to principal 
SAD, with 1.17 (SD = 1.07) mean additional diagnoses per participant. The most common 
additional diagnoses were Generalized Anxiety Disorder (n = 8; 19.5%), Major Depressive 
Disorder (n = 8; 19.5%), Persistent Depressive Disorder (n = 6; 14.6%), and Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder (n = 3; 7.3%). 
2.3 Administration of the WIMI 
Each session began with the WIMI preamble, designed to orient participants to the WIMI 
and operationalize the constructs of interest (for the full script, see Moscovitch et al., 2011). 
Participants were then asked whether they experience a y typically-recurring mental images 
during anxiety-provoking social situations and during non-anxiety provoking social situations. 
Participants were subsequently asked whether they have any autobiographical memories of 
specific social events that occurred at a particular time and place that they perceive as being 
related to the reported images. Participants provided narrative descriptions of these experiences 
under two conditions – recall and specific probe (described below) - that reflect differing levels 
of interviewer cuing and probing. Time of administration of the WIMI lasted approximately 60 
minutes per participant. Scheduling and administering the interview were always performed 
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2.3.1 Recall and specific probe conditions  
Participants who endorsed experiencing images and/or memories initially provided 
information about these experiences within the recall  condition, in which interviewers solicited 
descriptive narratives in a completely open-ended manner without any probing or cuing. After 
they finished speaking, participants were provided with a general probe, in which they were 
asked whether there were any further details they wished to provide. After completion of the 
recall and general probes for both images and memori s endorsed in anxiety-provoking and non-
anxiety provoking social situations, participants were administered a specific probe for each type 
of image and memory they endorsed, in which the intrviewer asked several follow-up questions 
about their initial description to elicit more elaborate detail.  
2.3.2 Rules for order of WIMI administration 
Probing about aversive and non-aversive images and memories occurred in a 
counterbalanced order across participants. Probes about images always preceded probes about 
memories. If participants denied experiencing an image for either valence, the corresponding 
memory section was not administered. The recall conditi  for all images and memories 
occurred first, followed by the probes for all images and memories endorsed.  
2.4 Coding of participant narratives 
Audio-recorded memory narratives were transcribed and coded across predetermined 
categories by trained research assistants who were blind to study hypotheses and the group status 
of participants. Each WIMI narrative was coded according to a standardized system based on the 
AI (Levine et al., 2002). Coders first identified the “main event” discussed in the narrative, then 
divided narratives into individual details representing separate utterances or grammatical clauses, 













    AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY IN SOCIAL ANXIETY  15 
 
definitions described earlier. Finally, coders identified the valence of each internal and external 
detail as positive, negative, or neutral. Examples of coded memory narratives are provided in the 
Appendix. 
2.5 Coder training and reliability 
Five research assistants (RAs) were trained to reach agreement with an expert coder, 
author ALB. In line with the methodology used in Mosc vitch et al. (2011), each of the RAs 
independently coded eight reliability narratives, and were required to obtain 80% agreement 
with ALB for internal and external details, respectively, and 90% agreement for total details. 
Two coders who initially did not meet these cutoffs coded two additional narratives, after which 
all coders met the established reliability cutoff. Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs; absolute 
agreement; two-way mixed model) were calculated betwe n ALB and each new coder’s totals. 
Two-way ICCs ranged from .82 to .98 for internal details and external details. For total details, 
two-way ICCs ranged from .98 to .99. Following the raining phase, participants’ remaining 
narratives were placed in a common pool and scored at random by coders who worked 
independently. To minimize potential coder drift, coders were required to finish coding their 
narratives within 6 weeks of completing reliability training. Following the completion of all 
coding, ALB doublechecked a random subset of each coder’s coded narratives for accuracy.  
2.6 Subjective memory ratings 
Participants rated various characteristics of their memories immediately after the 
completion of the recall condition for each type of memory endorsed, including perceived 
memory vividness (While envisioning/remembering the event, I could see it clearly in my mind) 
and memory intrusiveness (This memory has previously come to me out of the blu , without my 
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perception of themselves (The event just discussed influenced how I view myself) on Likert-type 
scales from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Participants also rated the emotional impact of 
retrieving each memory on measures of negative affect and positive affect, which consisted of 10 
emotion adjectives from each subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The instructions for the PANAS were modified so that 
participants were asked to reflect on how much theyfelt a certain way (e.g., interested, proud, 
embarrassed, nervous, etc.) while remembering the event in question. The 10 positive and 10 
negative emotion adjectives were sum-scored separately across participants for analyses. Finally, 
after the recall of each memory, participants estimated how long ago the event occurred. 
2.7 Self-report measures 
Participants completed self-report measures immediat ly fter the administration of the 
WIMI. The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000) is a well-validated measure of 
social anxiety symptoms (Antony, Coons, McCabe, Ashbaugh, & Swinson, 2006), which 
demonstrated strong internal consistency in the current study (α = .96). The depression subscale 
of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale - Short Version (DASS 21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
is a valid and reliable measure of depression sympto s (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & 
Swinson, 1998), which also showed strong reliability n the present study (α = .93). The Verbal 
section of the Shipley Institute for Living Scale (SILS; Shipley, 1940; Zachary, 1986) requires 
respondents to choose the correct definition of a target word from four possibilities and was 
administered to ensure that any observed group differences in WIMI performance could not be 
attributed to differing cognitive or verbal abilities. 
3. Data analytic plan and data preparation 
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To test our first hypothesis that participants with SAD and HCs would retrieve an 
equivalent number of specific aversive autobiographical memories across both aversive and non-
aversive events, chi-square analyses were conducted. Th se assessed the extent to which 
participants between the two groups endorsed (i.e.,said “yes, I experience those”) versus denied 
(i.e., said “no, I do not experience those”) having images and associated specific memories for 
aversive and non-aversive events.  
To test our second hypothesis that aversive memories would be recollected in greater 
internal episodic detail and would impact those with SAD more negatively than HCs, and that 
non-aversive memories would be retrieved in impoverish d internal episodic detail and impact 
participants with SAD less positively than HCs, a series of repeated-measures ANOVAs were 
conducted with Group (SAD vs. HC) as the between-subjects factor and Memory Valence 
(aversive vs. non-aversive memories) as the within-subjects variable. Internal memory details, 
external memory details, and subjective memory ratings served as the dependent variables in 
separate analyses. As in Söderlund et al. (2014), internal and external details were summed 
across levels of probing (recall + probes) and these total scores were used for analysis.3 These 
repeated-measures ANOVAs were necessarily based only on those participants who endorsed 
experiencing both aversive and non-aversive memories, with n’s ranging from 15 to 17. There 
were several participants who endorsed experiencing either aversive or non-aversive memories 
(but not both) and who were excluded from the omnibus repeated-measures ANOVA despite 
having useable data; thus, to maximize power we conducted follow-up group contrasts for 
significant omnibus interactions using data for anyparticipants who endorsed experiencing 
                                                        
3The interactive effects of Group and Memory Valence remained the same no matter whether coded internal and 
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either aversive or non-aversive memories, with n’s ranging from 20 to 30.4  
For hypothesis 2 analyses examining the impact of Gr up and Memory Valence on 
internal or external memory details, any significant omnibus effects of group were further probed 
with repeated-measures ANOVAs in which Group (SAD vs. HC) was the between-subjects 
factor and Detail Valence (positive, neutral, negative) was the within-subjects variable in order 
to unpackage whether differences in retrieved memory details depended on the valence of those 
details.  
For all ANOVAs, significant interaction effects were followed-up with t-tests. Cohen’s d
effect sizes were calculated for all group contrasts, with established conventions for small, 
medium, and large effects corresponding with values of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively (Cohen, 
1988).  
3.2 Missing data  
Missing item-level data were imputed using the expectation-maximization (EM) method 
for each measure separately. When less than 5% of data are missing, a single imputation using 
EM improves power while providing unbiased parameter stimates (Enders, 2001; Scheffer, 
2002). Overall, the percentage of missing data ranged from 0.04 to 1.4 percent across measures. 
Little's MCAR test was non-significant for 86% of measures administered. Data that were not 
missing completely at random based on Little’s MCAR test were not imputed. Inability to recall 
an aversive/non-aversive memory was not conceptualized as missing data (see Results). 
3.3 Data outliers and distributions  
Data were screened for univariate and multivariate outliers (3 SDs from the mean). As 
any extreme values were within the plausible range, all data were retained. To ensure the 
                                                        
4 The pattern of results of these follow-up contrasts in the larger sample remained unchanged when analyses were 
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integrity of obtained findings, all t-tests and correlations were replicated with 95% bias-corrected 
confidence-interval bootstrapping procedures in SPSS (Efron & Tibshirani, 1985; Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004), which is robust to non-normally distributed data (Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  
4. Results 
4.1 Types of social situations endorsed by participants 
 The types of social events participants recollected included both social interaction 
situations (e.g., going to parties, going on dates, meeting other people) and social performance 
situations (e.g., giving class presentations or speech s, speaking up at a meeting or in class). It 
was clear from reviewing the types of events retrieved that aversive and non-aversive memories 
represented similar kinds of social situations thatdiffered on the basis of whether their outcomes 
were described as being either favourable or unfavourable. To this end, examples of aversive 
events included “forgetting lines during a presentation,” and “not getting the job at my first 
group interview.” Examples of non-aversive events icluded “performing positively at a group 
lecture,” and “completing my first job interview at  grocery store.”  
4.2 Equivalence of groups 
There were no significant differences between SAD and HC participants in age, t(78) = 
0.24, p = .811, gender distribution, X2(2) = 1.04, p = .593, or ethnic/racial composition, X2(6) = 
5.33, p = .503. As expected, verbal scores on the SILS were equivalent across groups (SAD: M = 
31.21, SD = 4.51; HC: M = 30.37, SD = 4.59), t(79) = 0.835, p = .406. The two groups differed 
as expected across self-report symptom measures, with SAD participants reporting elevated 
symptom levels relative to HCs both on the SPIN (SAD: M = 45.75, SD = 8.22; HC: M = 15.45, 
SD = 15.22), t(79) = 11.186, p < .001, d = 2.477, and on the depression subscale of the DASS 
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remoteness of recollected events (in years) did not differ between groups for either aversive 
events (SAD: M = 10.65, SD = 12.24; HC: M = 10.10, SD = 14.06), t(54) = 0.156, p = .877, d = 
0.045, or non-aversive events (SAD: M = 3.55, SD = 7.42; HC: M = 7.95, SD = 10.42), t(40) = 
1.563, p = .126, d = 0.486. Moreover, there was neither a significant main effect of Memory 
Valence (aversive vs. non-aversive) nor a significant Group x Valence interaction effect on the 
remoteness of reported memories (all F’s < 3.164, all p’s > .085). 
4.3 Frequency of endorsed images and memories 
As hypothesized, between-groups chi-square analyses demonstrated that HC and SAD 
participants retrieved an equivalent proportion of aversive images and memories, and the same 
was true of non-aversive images and memories (see Table 1). Additional chi-square tests to 
explore potential group differences in the proportion of participants who endorsed only aversive 
or non-aversive images, only aversive or non-aversi memories, both aversive and non-aversive 
images or memories, and neither aversive or non-aversive images or memories were also non-
significant (all X2 < 1.27, all p’s > .204). 
4.4 Coded internal and external memory details 
Descriptive characteristics of coded memory details across groups are summarized in 
Table 2. A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA examining the effects of Group (SADs: n = 15 vs. 
HCs: n = 16) and Memory Valence (aversive vs. non-aversiv memories) on total number of 
retrieved internal details revealed a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 29) = 4.821, p = .036, 
η2 p = .143, with SAD participants retrieving a greater average number of internal details 
collapsed across memory valences, but no significant m in effect of Memory Valence, F(1, 29) = 
2.299, p = .140, η2 p = .073. These results were qualified by a significant Group x Memory 
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interaction effect, follow-up independent-samples t-tests for each type of memory separately 
revealed that for aversive memories, SAD participants (M = 57.89, SD = 26.40, n = 27) retrieved 
significantly more internal details than HCs (M = 41.00, SD = 21.78, n = 29), t(54) = 2.619, p = 
.011, d = 0.698. However, the number of retrieved internal details for non-aversive memories did 
not differ significantly between participants with SAD (M = 53.00, SD = 24.76, n = 20) and HCs 
(M = 40.86, SD = 19.96, n = 21), t(39) = 1.733, p = .091, d = 0.540. Paired-samples t-tests 
revealed that for participants with SAD, the number of internal details retrieved was greater for 
aversive memories (M = 63.93, SD = 23.74) than non-aversive memories (M = 48.20, SD = 
23.74), t(14) = 2.148, p = .050. Conversely, among HC participants, there was no difference in 
the number of internal details for aversive memories (M = 41.13, SD = 19.55) versus non-
aversive memories (M = 43.81, SD = 19.75), t(15) = 0.569, p = .578.  
To follow up on these effects, a 2 x 3 repeated-measures ANOVA examining the effects 
of Group (SADs: n = 27 vs. HCs: n = 29) and Detail Valence (positive, neutral, negative) on total 
number of retrieved internal details for aversive mmories revealed a significant main effect of 
Group, F(1, 54) = 6.857, p = .011, η2 p = .113, as described above. There was also a significant 
main effect of  Detail Valence, F(2, 54) = 82.987, p < .001, η2 p = .606, with negative details 
reported  more frequently than positive details (p < .001) and neutral details reported more 
frequently than either negative or positive details (p’  < .001). These results were qualified by a 
significant Group x Detail Valence interaction effect, F(2, 54) = 3.098, p = .049, η2 p = .054. 
Results of separate independent-samples t-t ts conducted on each type of detail revealed that 
SAD participants differed from HCs only in their enhanced retrieval of negatively-valenced 
internal details when recalling aversive memories (SADs: M = 22.15, SD = 10.29; HCs: M = 
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number of retrieved neutral or positive details, t(54)’s < 1.754, p’s > .085.  
The repeated-measures ANOVA examining the effects of Gr up and Detail Valence on 
the number of retrieved external memory details revealed no significant main or interaction 
effects, all F(1, 30)’s < 1.515, all p’s > .228, all η2 p’s < .050.  
4.5 Memory appraisals  
Descriptive characteristics of reported memory apprisals across groups are summarized 
in Table 2.  
4.5.1 Memory vividness, memory intrusiveness, and influence of memory on self-perception  
A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA examining the effects of Group (SADs: n = 15 vs. 
HCs: n = 17) and Memory Valence (aversive vs. non-aversiv) on reported memory vividness 
revealed no significant main or interaction effects, all F(1, 30)’s < 1.859, all p’s > .183, all η2 p’s  
< .058.  
Similarly, for memory intrusiveness, the repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no 
significant main effects of Group or Memory Valence, F’s (1, 30) < 0.435, p’s > .515, η2 p’s < 
.014. However, these results were qualified by a significant Group x Memory Valence 
interaction effect, F(1, 30) = 8.956, p = .005, η2 p = .230. Follow-up independent-samples t-tests 
for each type of memory separately revealed that SAD participants (M = 5.67, SD = 2.57, n = 27) 
reported that their aversive memories felt significantly more intrusive than those of HC 
participants (M = 3.17, SD = 2.14, n = 30), t(55) = 4.007, p < .001, d = 1.057. No difference was 
detected in the reported intrusiveness of non-aversive memories among participants with SAD 
(M = 4.00, SD = 2.47, n = 20) versus HCs (M = 3.91, SD = 2.60, n = 22), t(40) = 0.116, p = .908, 
d = 0.035. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that for participants with SAD, aversive memories 
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SD = 2.13), t(14) = 2.971, p = .010. Conversely, among HC participants, no difference was 
detected in the intrusiveness of aversive memories (M = 3.24, SD = 2.25) versus non-aversive 
memories (M = 4.47, SD = 2.67), t(16) = 1.522, p = .147.  
The repeated-measures ANOVA examining the effects of Gr up and Memory Valence 
on the degree to which the recollected events influe ced participants’ perceptions of themselves 
revealed a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 30) = 4.767, p = .037, η2 p = .137, with SAD 
participants perceiving a greater average influence on self-perception collapsed across memory 
valences. There was also a significant main effect of Memory Valence, F(1, 30) = 18.547, p < 
.001, η2 p = .382, with a greater average influence on self-prception attributed to aversive 
memories than non-aversive ones collapsed across grups. These results were qualified by a 
significant Group x Memory Valence interaction effect, F(1, 30) = 15.907, p < .001, η2 p = .347. 
Follow-up independent-samples t-tests for each type of memory separately revealed that for 
aversive memories, SAD participants (M = 6.63, SD = 2.26, n = 27) reported a significantly 
greater influence on self-perception than HC participants (M = 3.57, SD = 1.74, n = 30), t(55) = 
5.778, p < .001, d = 1.517. However, no difference was detected in the reported effects of non-
aversive memories on self-perception among participants with SAD (M = 4.35, SD = 2.13, n = 
20) versus HCs (M = 4.36, SD = 2.65, n = 22), t(40) = 0.018, p = .986, d = 0.004. Paired-samples 
t-tests revealed that for participants with SAD, aversive memories were rated as being 
significantly more influential of self-perception (M = 7.07, SD = 2.02) than non-aversive 
memories (M = 4.00, SD = 2.10), t(14) = 5.890, p < .001. Conversely, among HC participants, no 
difference was detected in the influence of aversiv memories (M = 4.18, SD = 1.78) versus non-
aversive memories (M = 4.06, SD = 2.46) on self-perception, t(16) = 0.226, p = .824. These 
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4.5.2 Impact of memory retrieval on positive and negative affect 
A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA examining the effects of Group (SADs: n = 15 vs. 
HCs: n = 17) and Memory Valence (aversive vs. non-aversiv) on reported PANAS positive 
affect revealed a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 30) = 9.491, p = .004, η2 p = .240, with 
SAD participants reporting significantly lower levels of positive affect during memory retrieval 
on average. There was also a significant main effect of Memory Valence, F(1, 30) = 22.699, p < 
.001, η2 p = .431, with aversive memories generating significantly less positive affect than non-
aversive memories when collapsed across groups. The Group x Memory Valence interaction 
effect was not significant, F(1, 30) = 0.026, p = .873, η2 p = .001, suggesting that the magnitude 
of the observed difference in positive affect between groups was not moderated by the valence of 
the memories retrieved.  
The 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA examining the effcts of Group and Memory 
Valence on reported PANAS negative affect revealed no significant main effect of Group, F(1, 
30) = 1.582, p = .218, η2 p = .050. There was, however, a significant main effect of Memory 
Valence, F(1, 30) = 38.257, p < .001, η2 p = .560, with aversive memories generating 
significantly more negative affect, on average, than non-aversive memories, when collapsed 
across groups. The Group x Memory Valence interaction effect was also significant, F(1, 30) = 
5.530, p = .025, η2 p = .156. Follow-up independent-samples t-tests for each type of memory 
separately revealed that during retrieval of aversi memories, SAD participants (M = 48.31, SD 
= 17.25, n = 27) experienced significantly higher levels of negative affect than HC participants 
(M = 30.38, SD = 18.82, n = 30), t(55) = 3.734, p < .001, d = 0.993. However, no difference was 
detected in the reported effects of non-aversive memory retrieval on negative affect for 
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22), t(40) = 0.737, p = .466, d = 0.232. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that for participants with 
SAD, aversive memory retrieval activated significantly more negative affect (M = 44.15, SD = 
16.88) than non-aversive memory retrieval (M = 13.60, SD = 4.85), t(14) = 7.199, p < .001. 
Similarly, HC participants reported experiencing sinificantly more negative affect during 
aversive memory retrieval (M = 30.73, SD = 19.28) than during retrieval of non-aversive 
memories (M = 17.01, SD = 14.63), t(16) = 2.459, p = .026.  
Discussion 
This study was designed to enhance our understanding of the phenomenological 
characteristics of autobiographical memories in SAD. s hypothesized, participants’ capacity to 
access and retrieve specific autobiographical memori s was not moderated by diagnostic status 
or valence. That is, irrespective of their valence, both mental images and their associated specific 
autobiographical memories were readily accessible for both individuals with SAD and non-
anxious controls – findings that are consistent with those observed previously in undergraduates 
with high versus low levels of trait social anxiety (Moscovitch et al., 2011). Together, results 
from these two studies indicate that negative images and autobiographical memories of socially 
painful events are commonly experienced not only by highly anxious individuals or by those 
with SAD, but by people across the entire social anxiety spectrum.   
It is important to note that WIMI interviewers in the current study were trained to accept 
autobiographical memories that were endorsed by participants only if those memories were 
"specific" according to the way specificity is commonly defined on the AMT (i.e., as referencing 
a specific event that occurred at a particular time and place; Williams et al., 2007). Thus, any 
"yes" response for memory endorsement rates (see Tabl 1) represented a "specific" memory as 
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"overgeneral" memories that participants may have retrieved. In this way, the absence of group 
differences in the retrieval of specific autobiographical memories in the present study is also 
consistent with results of previous AMT studies that ve shown no differences in retrieval rates 
of overgeneral vs. specific memories in patients with SAD vs. controls (e.g., Heidenreich, 
Junghanns-Royack, & Stangier, 2007; Wenzel, Jackson, & Holt, 2002).  
Approximately 15% of participants with SAD did not report having intrusive aversive 
images, and about one-third had no autobiographical memories of aversive social events even if 
they reported experiencing aversive images. A simple explanation for these findings is that non-
endorsement of mental imagery might reflect individual differences in participants’ abilities to 
think visually and use imagery, as previous studies of individuals with SAD have shown 
(McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Saulsman, & Thibodeau, 2015). Similarly, non-responses to probes about 
specific memories might simply represent recall faiures. Alternatively, some participants may 
have been reluctant to open up and share aversive experi nces due to feelings of shame about 
revealing humiliating memories of perceived social failures to interviewers. However, our 
experience during data collection was that most participants were very forthcoming and that the 
majority of participants did, in fact, reveal such failures, despite reporting elevated negative 
affect, including shame, when such memories were ret iev d. Reported memories were also rated 
as being highly self-relevant, suggesting that participants were retrieving important experiences. 
Future research could examine whether these results would replicate if participants are instructed 
to provide written descriptions of their memories, in which social desirability concerns may be 
even less salient. Future research might also explore subtypes of images (e.g., those that are more 
realistic/concrete versus those that reflect abstract/symbolic or dreamlike elements). It is 
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retrieving a corresponding autobiographical memory, while abstract/symbolic images may be 
more difficult for participants to connect with autobiographical experiences or more likely to 
represent schema-based information that is not derived from a specific autobiographical memory.  
Even though many participants with SAD endorsed having specific negative 
autobiographical memories of socially painful events, we must be careful about concluding that 
the mere occurrence of an aversive experience in and of itself might be a causal factor in the 
etiology of SAD, as HCs generally reported having memories of such experiences as well. 
Rather, a variety of factors might affect how such events – and corresponding memories of such 
events – are appraised, and it is these appraisals that might principally distinguish people who 
have SAD or are likely to develop SAD from those who do not. Indeed, participants with SAD 
appraised the characteristics of socially adverse event memories more negatively than HCs, 
rating them as being significantly more intrusive, as having a greater impact on their self-
perception, and as fueling significantly higher levels of negative affect during retrieval. People’s 
appraisals of salient self-defining events and memories could certainly play an important role in 
the development of particular beliefs they hold about themselves or others and/or strengthen 
existing negative beliefs that fuel the persistence of anxiety symptoms (Romano et al., in press).  
Our methods in the present study were intentionally designed to allow for an examination 
of episodic recollection that moves beyond the AMT’s distinction between specific and 
overgeneral memories as the level of analysis. Here, we analyzed the details of the retrieved 
memory narratives themselves with the use of the innovative coding system drawn from the 
Autobiographical Interview (AI), as described in the Introduction. Although there were no group 
differences in retrieval rates of specific aversive or non-aversive memories, we found that 
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their specific memories, such that they tended to re rieve more internal details (and, in particular, 
negatively-valenced internal details) than HCs for memories of aversive, but not non-aversive, 
social events. Given that internal details are, by definition, retrieved by traveling back through 
time within one's imagination to relive a particular episode that occurred at a specific time and 
place in one’s personal past, these findings support the potential importance of mental time travel 
in the phenomenology of biased episodic memory recall in social anxiety. Interestingly, mental 
time travel to both recollected pasts and imagined futures are subserved by similar cognitive and 
neurobiological systems (see Addis & Schacter, 2008), suggesting that episodic memory 
processes may represent a crucial link between pre-event anxious anticipation and post-event 
processing (PEP) in social anxiety; however, extant research on this topic is limited and findings 
are mixed (see Mellings & Alden, 2000; Modini, Rapee, & Abbott, 2018). In future studies, use 
of the WIMI and AI methodology may be helpful for tracking the retrieval of particular memory 
details across time. 
Further investigation of PEP in SAD may also help to rovide clues about why people 
with SAD might recollect negative social experiences in such rich episodic detail. It is possible 
that episodic enhancement may occur, at least in part, during event encoding such that anxious 
individuals attend to and process negative aspects of the event in greater detail as the event itself 
unfolds. Alternatively (and possibly in tandem with enhanced encoding), memories of aversive 
social events may be processed in more detail and embellished over time through the effects of 
repeated rehearsal via PEP, likely in interaction with interpretation biases (e.g., Hertel, 
Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008). As stated above, in PEP, socially anxious individuals 
“play back” and ruminate about negative social experiences (see Gavric, Moscovitch, Rowa, & 
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rumination, with evidence supporting the view that analytical rumination focused on self-
evaluation and abstract meanings may fuel overgeneral memories and associated maladaptive 
outcomes, particularly for people who are depressed (Watkins, 2008). In the present study, 
however, the specific memories that were retrieved by participants with SAD contained ample 
sensory-perceptual detail and hardly resembled the types of sensory-detail-deficient overgeneral 
memories that have been described in the depression literature (Williams et al., 2007). It is 
possible that heightened negative affect during recall of specific aversive autobiographical 
memories in SAD activates the processing of “local” threat-relevant sensory/perceptual detail 
rather than “global” or big picture detail that is generally favoured by the cognitive system 
(Gasper & Clore, 2002), thereby facilitating episodic enhancement for local details. This 
tentative hypotheses could be tested in future well-designed experimental studies. 
With repeated rehearsal over time as individuals with SAD engage in PEP, aversive 
memories may become even more highly accessible and detailed through the processes of 
memory reconstruction, embellishment, and enhancement (Moscovitch, 2008; Schacter, 2012). 
Though studies on undergraduate participants have found mixed support for the hypothesis that 
PEP mediates the relation between social anxiety and biased recall of social information (Cody 
& Teachman, 2010; Edwards, Rapee, & Franklin, 2003), a recent study demonstrated that 
undergraduate students with higher levels of social anxiety accurately recalled negative and 
positive feedback they received about a social task in the immediate aftermath of the task, but 
their recall of positive information became more negatively biased as time went on (Glazier & 
Alden, 2017). However, this study was not conducted on a clinical sample of individuals with 
SAD, nor was PEP explicitly measured as an underlying mechanism that may have accounted for 
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demonstrated that the relationship between social anxiety and PEP in the week following an 
anxiety-provoking social task was mediated both by the extent to which participants negatively 
evaluated their performance on the task and the extent to which they held positive metacognitive 
beliefs about engaging in PEP. Individuals with SAD may believe that engaging in repeated 
mental review in the aftermath of such experiences is adaptive for their social survival, given 
their perceived tenuous standing within the social hierarchy and their assumption that 
committing a social blunder has the potential to put them at serious risk of ostracism or exclusion 
from the social group (Moscovitch, Waechter, Bielak, Rowa, & McCabe, 2015; Rodebaugh, 
2009; Weeks, Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton, & Jakatdar, 2009). Future prospective studies 
could investigate whether PEP mediates the retrieval of internal details for memories of aversive 
social experiences.  
With respect to clinical implications, results highli t the potential benefits of imagery- 
and memory-based interventions for SAD that facilitate emotional expression (Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010) and enhance CBT outcomes (McEvoy et al., 2015; Stopa, 2009). Among such 
interventions, Imaginal Rescripting (IR) is uniquely designed to target and modify negative 
autobiographical memory content and appraisal. Thoug  the specific cognitive mechanisms of IR 
remain poorly understood, studies have found that IR promotes significant improvements in 
symptoms and core beliefs for patients with SAD after only a single-session administration (see 
Norton & Abbott, 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015; Wild & Clark, 2011). Future research on 
imagery- and memory-based interventions and processes, including IR, would provide an ideal 
context for examining how socially aversive experienc s are encoded, consolidated, and stored in 
memory (e.g., Çili & Stopa, 2015; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 
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elucidate the conditions under which positive versus negative autobiographical memory 
representations – and the internal and external detils that comprise them - may become 
emotionally activated, retrieved, and psychotherapeutically modified within specific contexts 
(see Lane et al., 2015). Well-designed studies that use the WIMI to elicit and irectly measure 
(rather than simply infer) changes in negative and positive imagery- and memory-based mental 
representations before and after treatment could help enable researchers test competing theories 
about the precise cognitive mechanisms that underlie the effectiveness of CBT, including 
emotional processing (Foa & McNally, 1996), competition retrieval (Brewin, 2006), inhibitory 
learning (Craske et al., 2008), and memory reconsolidation (Ecker, 2015) (see also Moscovitch, 
Antony, & Swinson, 2009).  
Though the current study had several strengths, including a community based sample of 
clinically diagnosed and control participants, a combination of subjectively reported and blind-
coded outcomes, and comparisons of aversive and non-aversive memories, it was also limited by 
several factors, which future studies may help to address. First, while results supported the 
negative memory enhancement hypothesis, they did not support the “positivity deficit” 
hypothesis, in-so-far as there was no evidence that memories of non-aversive social events were 
less accessible for individuals with SAD than HCs and, when accessed, were retrieved with 
degraded detail or appraised in a less positive manner. However, it is possible that positivity 
deficits would emerge for participants with SAD if they were instructed to retrieve memories that 
were more strongly or objectively positive, such as those representing obvious interpersonal 
achievements or social milestones that were associated with significantly enhanced feelings of 
social pride, acceptance, or inclusion, and this hypothesis should be re-examined under these 
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would be of interest to examine their retrieval and ppraisal properties in comparison to 
memories of aversive social failures or experiences about which participants felt inherently 
ashamed or excluded (see LaBar & Cabeza, 2006). In a similar vein, future research must also 
investigate whether episodic enhancements in SAD are unique to socially painful experiences or 
might also extend to memories of aversive non-social events.  
Furthermore, as with most studies on autobiographical memory, it was impossible to 
ascertain whether enhancement of episodic memory details was due to (a) remembering more 
veridical information about the events or (b) unintentionally embellishing memory details with 
non-factual information. Future studies could asses memory for standardized stimuli and use 
creative methods for disentangling these two factors (e.g., Hertel et al., 2008), but the use of such 
stimuli would inherently hinder the generalizability of conclusions to real-life autobiographical 
memories. Indeed, even assessing memory for a standardized social blunder elicited in the 
laboratory would be methodologically limited in so far as participants could never be compelled 
to appraise such contrived experiences as being socially ostly or self-defining, which may be 
important factors that fuel the episodic enhancement of autobiographical memories for aversive 
events within naturalistic social contexts. 
In addition, even though the present study represents a ecessary initial step in which 
WIMI and AI outcomes were examined for the first time in a clinical sample of participants with 
SAD, the interpretations of our findings are necessarily limited by the absence of a 
psychopathology control group, which would have allowed for more definitive conclusions about 
whether the observed effects were unique and specific to social anxiety per se. Such specificity 
may be expected, given the socially threatening nature of the aversive memories that were 
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both social and non-social memories in a group of participants with SAD and no significant 
comorbid symptoms of depression as well as a group of individuals with depression and no 
secondary symptoms of social anxiety. Though a study of this nature would be desirable, a 
significant challenge facing researchers would be that symptoms of depression and SAD tend to 
be intricately intertwined and highly comorbid with one another  (e.g., Moscovitch et al., 2005). 
Thus, any conclusions drawn from such a study would have to be tempered by appropriate 
caveats about external validity and the extent to which findings would be generalizable to the 
commonly overlapping presentation of these disorders in nature (Ohayon & Schatzberg, 2010).  
Finally, results of the present study do not directly highlight the real-life implications of 
episodic enhancement in SAD. Even if socially anxious individuals exhibit enhanced episodic 
memory for aversive past personal events, how might this impact their day-to-day lives? Future 
research is needed to understand how negative memory enhancement in SAD might affect 
outcomes that ought to be closely related to, and perhaps even dependent on, episodic memory, 
including social problem solving and prospection (Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996; Madore 
& Schacter, 2016). 
Despite these limitations and caveats, the present study was the first to characterize the 
mnemonic architecture of aversive relative to non-aversive social experiences in SAD. Though 
conclusions must be tempered by the need for additional research to replicate and extend our 
initial findings, results are interesting and cast new light on autobiographical memory bias in 
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Table 1.  
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Memory Characteristics of Recollected Social Events Ba ed on the Largest Possible Sample of 
Participants Across Groups Who Retrieved Either Aversi  or Non-Aversive Memories 
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Figure 1. Memories of aversive social experiences were appraised as influencing self-perception to a 
significantly greater degree by participants with social anxiety disorder (SAD) than by healthy controls 
(HCs). No difference between the groups was observed for appraisals of non-aversive social memories. 
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Appendix 
1. Example of a SAD participant’s coded memory narrative (main event: going to a party at a pub) 
 
    [internal; neutral]                 [internal; neutral]                                          [internal; neutral]                  
It was a social event that I attended to meet new people. It was a group that I found. It was in a  
 
[internal; neutral]                                   [internal; neutral]                        [internal; 
neutral]                  
bar, like in a pub environment and they told me everyone would be at the back. It was around, 25  
 
               [internal; neutral]                 [internal; neutral]                              [external; neutral]                  
people. I arrived there and I went very nicely dresed up, but as soon as I got there and I  
 
   [internal; neutral]                     [internal; negative]                  
saw the huge group at the back of the room, I started getting very nervous and I was feeling  
 
[internal; negative]                  [internal; negative]           [internal; negative]               [external; 
negative]                                         
cold, and I felt my heart beating really fast. I didn’t want to approach, I was very nervous, very  
 
[internal; negative]                   [internal; neutral]                                                      [external; neutral]                 
scared. But I pushed myself, I pushed myself out of my comfort zone. I arrived and I just  
 
[internal; negative] [internal; negative]          [internal; neutral]                                     
couldn’t talk. I was frozen. Part of me kept pushing me to try to become, uhh, part of the  
 
                      [internal; negative]               [internal; negative]                  
group, but it was really hard for me to talk to people. I felt like I was being rejected even when it  
 
[internal; neutral]                   [internal; neutral]                            [internal; negative]                  
wasn’t the case, because they were talking to me, I just felt I didn’t belong. I felt that they were  
 
[internal; negative]                  [internal; negative]                     [internal; neutral]                  
just, I was being judged and rejected. So I sat ther  hoping more people to come talk to me  
 
[internal; neutral]                       [internal; neutral]                  
but I had to put part of myself to, to go and talk to people, cause no one really knows each other,  
 
[internal; neutral]                                       [external; negative]              [internal; negative]     
[internal; neutral]                                   
even when they look so comfortable. I felt like I was like frozen, not part of it. So, I ordered a  
 
                 [internal; neutral]                                  [internal; negative]             
drink. I stayed there for like half an hour, feeling the same uncomfortable and I ended up leaving  
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negative]                  
without anyone noticing. To escape out of my anxiety and awkwardness, cause I wasn’t being  
 
               [internal; negative]                [internal; negative]                     
myself… I couldn’t talk, I was just sitting there talking to no one. 
 
 
2. Example of an HC participant’s coded memory narrative (main event: a date in a restaurant) 
 
[internal; neutral]                                [internal; neutral]       [internal; neutral] [internal; neutral]                            
So, the event, I was on a date, he had black hair, he was Asian, he wasn’t tall. He was like my  
 
[internal; neutral]    [internal; neutral]              [internal; neutral]        [internal; neutral]        [internal; 
neutral]                                           
height, he was wearing a dress shirt. We dressed up and went on a date, so I wore a dress. And  
 
[internal; positive]                    [internal; neutral]                         [internal; neutral]                  
we both looked good, it was sunny outside, the specifi  image so yeah it was in Famoso’s. We  
 
[internal; neutral]                                [internal; positive]                                          [external; neutral]                
were sitting at a high table, and we were laughing about something, I can’t remember  
 
                       [internal; negative]                   [external; neutral]                
what, and then I remember thinking in my head oh my god why did I just say that.  I don’t know  
 
                                        [external; neutral]                             [internal; neutral]                  
why I remember that but that’s what I remember. And he’s wearing a blue dress shirt. There’s  
 
[internal; neutral]                                       [internal; neutral]                    [internal; neutral]                  




























    AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY IN SOCIAL ANXIETY  1 
 
Highlights 
• Examined aversive/non-aversive memory retrieval in social anxiety disorder (SAD)  
 
• SADs and controls equally accessed aversive and non-aversive memories 
 
• SADs’ aversive memories contained richer episodic detail than those of controls 
 
• SADs appraised aversive memories as more distressing, intrusive, and self-relevant 
 
• No group differences observed in recall or appraisals of non-aversive memories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
